What Happened When Automation Came To General Motors?

General Motors was once the world's most profitable company -- for two decades -- and by 1970 its revenue was $22.8 billion (or $152 billion in today's dollars). But five weeks ago GM announced that it was finally ending small-car production and closing its Lordstown Assembly plant in Youngstown, Ohio.

So what went wrong? Quartz argues that GM's decline 'began with its quest to turn people into machines,' as 'the company turned assembly work into an interlocking chain of discrete tasks, to be executed by robots whenever possible.' In an article shared by Slashdot reader reporter, Quartz argues that seen in that light, the company's response to a 1972 strike 'marked the beginning of the company's long but uneven descent, which would be characterized by a repeated impulse to bet on fancy, futuristic but unproven technologies while undervaluing its workers.'

But the strike also raised larger issues for 'a massive special task force' issuing a federal report on the quality of working life in 1972, titled Work in America...

[T]echnology had failed in its promise to free humans from drudgery and wring profit from their talents, the authors said. On the contrary, the new jobs created generally required minimal expertise and therefore prevented workers from honing their skills. That stymied career mobility and left people mired in the same torpor of boredom for decades. Despite this, America continued to offer its young people increasingly rigorous education -- even as work life left little opportunity to apply it.... The larger hopes and ambitions of Work in America -- the vision that saw satisfying work itself as essential to the health of American society and democracy -- exists now as little but a curio in the footnotes of academic journals....

Meanwhile, GM continued to lavish spending on big capital investments, confident that the secret to competitiveness lay in replacing humans with technology. But as in Lordstown, the spending bore little fruit. As automotive analyst Maryann Keller recounted in her 1989 book Rude Awakening, one GM executive observed that, between 1980 and 1985, the company shelled out an eye-popping $45 billion in capital investment. Despite that spending, its global market share rose by but a single percentage point, to 22%. 'For the same amount of money, we could buy Toyota and Nissan outright,' said the executive -- which would have instantly bumped GM's market share to 40%.

At GM quality suffered because 'Instead of making flawless cars, workers simply did their assigned jobs,' Quartz argues. 'Workers had no big-picture goal of building cars together to motivate them.'

The 7,000-word article concludes by noting that Youngstown residents still hope that their car factory will re-open. But it's also possible that instead Lordstown Assembly 'will remain standing, but empty, a vast roadside reminder of a corporate elite's doomed quest to cheapen labor by stripping the human need for skill, learning, independence, and purpose out of production, by reimagining people as machines.'

Read more of this story at Slashdot.