Virginia Tech researchers raise red flags about mixed-reality security

In a new study, researchers at Virginia Tech spelled out a variety of security hazards that could compromise mixed-reality systems.

The researchers highlighted security threats involving the manipulation of virtual objects when users collaborated via mixed reality headsets. The work involved 20 participants from the school, with most having little or no experience with mixed-reality headsets. In many cases, the participants did not know they were being attacked; instead, they blamed technical glitches or latency issues for the problems they encountered.

“Malicious entities could exploit vulnerabilities to disrupt critical collaborations, manipulating users’ perception of the environment, and impairing their ability to coordinate, potentially resulting in physical or psychological harm to users and bystanders,” the researchers said.

There has not been enough focus on potential vulnerabilities within the XR platforms, said Anshel Sag, principal analyst at Moor Insights & Strategy.

“The reality is that a lot of these platforms are pretty closed and it’s hard to evaluate the code,” Sag said.

The study was done using a HoloLens 2 headset, which Microsoft discontinued last year. The HoloLens 2 platform is out of date, Sag noted, something the researchers acknowledged.

“There are only a few collaboration platforms in use today for enterprise and defense, and a good chunk of the potentially vulnerable collaboration tools most likely don’t connect to the open internet,” Sag said. “That’s why I think a lot of the implementations that the government wants to use — or any kind of secure applications like enterprises [rely on] — need to have code evaluations and audits.”

The researchers said the attacks would be difficult for users to comprehend and identify. “An attack might alter the environment for one user without affecting the view of others or disrupt communication between users at a critical moment,” the researchers said. 

They noted the possibility of a “click redirection attack,” which they likened to web-based clickjacking. In this case, a malicious party could attack a 3D object in a collaborators’ field of view. When the person tries to move the object, the action affects another 3D object instead.

“The collaborative environment can make the unintended movement of virtual objects a potential cause of mistrust and confusion between the collaborators,” the researchers wrote.

Another attack — called an “object occlusion attack”— involved placing an invisible barrier on 3D objects to prevent interaction from a distance. And a “spatial occlusion attack” expanded that concept by placing an invisible boundary over a larger region and blocking interaction with multiple objects. 

Occlusion attacks could affect productivity in projects as collaborators might not have similar fields of view. That kind of attack would force headset users to get closer to virtual objects before they interact with them.

The researchers also launched a latency attack by slowing network speeds between participants’ headsets. The network attack significantly undermined the user experience.

To safeguard virtual systems, the researchers recommended educating users about potential security threats and building in security by design. Safety measures could include auditory cues to identify the location of objects and a warning system to identify security threats.

Additionally, headset developers could include UI changes with toggles and controls that “highlight all objects in the environment similar to basic 3D view management,” the researchers wrote.

The research study was written by Maha Sajid, Syed Ibrahim Mustafa Shah Bukhari, Bo Ji, and Brendan David-John. They could not be reached for comment.